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12.1 Introduction
In July 1997, following the decline of the Thai bhat, the Indonesian ru-
piah fell dramatically (or so it seemed at the time). Since that initial decline
of the rupiah, the Indonesian economy has undergone tremendous change.
The rupiah has been subject to large swings, prices of some goods have risen
substantially, and billions of dollars have been loaned by international lend-
ing organizations. These are not subtle changes. In this paper, we make a
ﬁrst-pass attempt at providing early estimates of the impact of the Indone-
sian economic crisis on Indonesia’s poor.
Although some might argue that the very poor are so impoverished that
they are essentially insulated from swings in the international economy, it is
more frequently argued that the very poor are among the most vulnerable
to such swings. This is especially probable for the urban poor. Furthermore,
in countries with little or no social insurance, any impacts of price changes
on the very poor are unlikely to be muted by government policies in the way
that they might be in richer countries.
These issues matter. From a broad humanitarian view, the magnitude of
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and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank.the price changes and the size of the aﬀected population argue that there is
value simply to understanding what has happened. From a more narrow
political view, the political economy of price changes may well depend in
crucial ways on who bears the brunt of price increases. From the viewpoint
of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that oﬀer
policy advice and (sometimes) loan conditionality, understanding how that
advice might aﬀect the poor is important. Finally, from a ridiculously nar-
row academic perspective, there is not an abundance of research on pos-
sible links between the international economy and the very poor.
In this paper, we use pre-crisis household-level data from approximately
60,000 households throughout Indonesia. These data provide a detailed view
of expenditure patterns prior to the onset of the crisis. We match these expen-
diture data to detailed postcrisis data on prices. By combining these sources
of data, we analyze how the inﬂation that followed the ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected
households. Special attention is paid to how the crisis aﬀected the very poor.
We ﬁnd that prices for most commodities did indeed jump dramatically
and that these price increases tended to hit the cost of living of poor house-
holds disproportionately hard. The impact, though, varies with where the
household lives, because it turns out that the price increases were not uni-
form throughout the country. Further, it matters whether the household
was in an urban or rural area. Rural households were better able to alle-
viate some of the disadvantageous price increases through limited self-
production of food. The poor urban households, on the other hand, were
the most adversely impacted.
The paper proceeds by including some background on the crisis in the
next section. Section 12.3 presents the data, and section 12.4 describes our
methodology. Section 12.5 presents results on the importance of hetero-
geneity in prices, products, and consumers. Section 12.6 investigates the im-
pacts of the crisis on the poor, while section 12.7 concludes.
12.2 Some Background
We begin by setting the stage. The changes the Indonesian economy has
undergone are dramatic. The purpose of this section is to very brieﬂy review
some of those changes. As background, table 12.1 provides some informa-
tion on recent changes in prices and exchange rates. From December 1996
until July 1997, the rupiah traded in a narrow range of around 2,400 to the
U.S. dollar. The consumer price index (CPI) provided by the Bank of In-
donesia shows stable prices for each of four aggregates—food, housing,
clothing, and health. In July 1997, the Thai bhat nose-dived and the rupiah
followed suit. In table 12.1, this appears in the August 1997 entry, where the
rupiah is reported at 3,035 to the dollar. Although this was a sudden depre-
ciation on the order of 20 percent, prices rose only with a lag. Throughout
the remainder of 1997, the rupiah continued to depreciate against the dol-
lar and (except in November) against the yen. The food CPI rose from 105
394 James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed Friedmanto 120—a noticeable increase but not an overwhelming one. The CPI for
housing, clothing, and health care rose yet more modestly. On the economic
policy front, the IMF approved a $10 billion loan, while the World Bank
pledged $4.5 billion for a three-year program.
It was not until 1998 that matters became considerably more problem-
atic. On 8 January, sometimes referred to as “Black Thursday,” the rupiah
began a free fall, and news accounts reported panic-like food purchasing.
The exchange rate fell at one point in January to above 16,000 rupiah per
dollar, and the CPI for food jumped almost as much in January as it had the
previous six months combined. The CPI for clothing jumped even more. As
international pressure to drop a proposed currency board increased and aid
was deferred, uncertainty mounted. For the ﬁrst four months of 1998,
prices continued to rise, as documented in the last four columns of table
12.1. In May 1998, riots spread, and over one thousand people were re-
ported killed. The World Bank postponed two loans totaling over one bil-
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Table 12.1 Some Background
Rupiah Exchange Rates CPI for
US$ 100 Yen Food Housing Clothing Health
1996 Dec. 2,383.00 2,058.39 100.52 101.98 100.99 102.08
1997 Jan. 2,396.00 1,965.56 103.33 102.67 101.91 104.46
Feb. 2,406.00 2,000.63 105.99 102.90 102.43 105.32
Mar. 2,419.00 1,955.92 105.28 103.29 102.64 105.59
Apr. 2,433.00 1,921.19 105.24 103.99 102.62 107.56
May 2,440.00 2,095.15 105.30 104.82 102.71 107.69
Jun. 2,450.00 2,148.49 104.45 105.18 102.88 108.15
Jul. 2,599.00 2,210.83 105.93 105.82 102.80 108.41
Aug. 3,035.00 2,546.48 107.60 106.34 103.48 108.77
Sep. 3,275.00 2,715.56 109.59 107.58 104.56 109.21
Oct. 3,670.00 3,061.33 113.50 108.35 107.14 110.67
Nov. 3,648.00 2,867.48 117.25 106.82 107.01 112.27
Dec. 4,650.00 3,578.31 120.54 107.84 110.58 114.18
1998 Jan. 10,375.00 8,304.99 133.26 113.79 127.30 124.22
Feb. 8,750.00 6,895.21 157.79 123.28 145.14 148.98
Mar. 8,325.00 6,316.16 166.71 128.61 161.39 155.88
Apr. 7,970.00 6,034.46 176.56 131.56 168.39 164.12
May 10,525.00 7,580.14 183.42 136.99 176.01 168.06
Jun. 14,900.00 10,583.91 196.39 139.17 195.29 171.97
Jul. 13,000.00 9,048.21 220.27 146.93 219.23 186.41
Aug. 11,075.00 7,824.11 240.31 153.51 225.73 197.99
Sep. 10,700.00 7,921.25 261.00 155.92 225.22 204.49
Oct. 7,550.00 6,546.72 256.16 157.35 220.97 208.58
Nov. 7,300.00 5,903.77 255.70 158.11 215.99 210.71
Dec. 8,025.00 7,000.49 263.22 159.03 219.71 212.54
1999 Jan. 8,950.00 7,697.62 281.09 160.62 232.11 214.07
Source: Bank of Indonesia data available online [http://www.bi.go.id/ind/datastatistik/index.
htm].lion dollars, and the World Bank and IMF as well as many embassies evac-
uated nonessential staﬀ. On 21 May, President Suharto resigned. The ru-
piah traded at around 11,000 immediately after the resignation. The Bank
of Indonesia reported the largest monthly rupiah-to-dollar rate in June
1998—14,900. Thereafter the rupiah began a gradual appreciation (albeit
from an astoundingly low level.) The CPI reported rising prices through
September 1998. The CPI for food reached 261 (relative to a level of about
100 in January 1997), while the CPIs for housing, clothing, and health hit
156,225, and 204, respectively. (Throughout this period the CPI for housing
was relatively more stable—perhaps reﬂecting the somewhat nontraded na-
ture of housing.) Although peaceful protests turned violent in Jakarta in
mid-November 1998, order was quickly restored.
It would of course be a tremendous oversimpliﬁcation to attribute these
changes to the international economy, or to any other single cause. Price
levels and exchange rates are endogenously determined. Our goal is to ana-
lyze the impact of the changes surveyed in table 12.1, but we do not attempt
to analyze the root cause(s) of the macroeconomic changes. We realize, for
example, that it is (barely) conceivable that purely domestic inﬂation sud-
denly ran rampant, leading to the rupiah’s depreciation, and in this (un-
likely) scenario, the price changes in table 12.1 would have little to do with
the international economy. Given most accounts of the East Asian crisis
and the contagious behavior of other East Asian exchange rates and price
levels, it seems plausible that there was indeed an international element to
the changes surveyed in table 12.1.
Our goals include a more disaggregated analysis of the impacts of the
price changes. The aggregated nature of the ﬁgures in table 12.1 hides po-
tentially important heterogeneity. The ﬁrst type of heterogeneity concerns
heterogeneity within commodity groups. For example, “Food” contains
hundreds of items, and it is possible that the price behavior of those items
consumed by the nonpoor is quite diﬀerent from the price behavior of food
items consumed principally by the poor. The second type of heterogeneity
is geographical. Indonesia is a geographically dispersed country where
simple arbitrage may be costly due to transport costs. This suggests that
there may be signiﬁcant price variation within a narrowly deﬁned product
class across geographic areas. What happens to prices in especially poor ar-
eas may be quite diﬀerent from what happens to prices in the wealthier ar-
eas. The third type of heterogeneity is across consumers. Our focus is noton
the representative consumer; rather, we care about the consumption pat-
terns of the very poor. Examining aggregate consumption patterns may be
quite misleading in this context.
12.3 Data Concerns and Constraints
There are many ways one could estimate how the large changes in prices
in Indonesia over the last one and a half years have aﬀected the poor. In the
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With this in mind, we brieﬂy outline the data that are, and are not, available.
We begin with the unattainable ideal. In the best case, one would have de-
tailed consumption data that spanned the period before and after the ﬁ-
nancial crises of 1997–98 for thousands (or tens of thousands) of house-
holds. The time series variation would allow the researcher to examine how
consumption patterns changed when faced with the large price changes.
The large household survey would give the researcher enough households
so that a focus on the very poor would still allow a suﬃcient number of ob-
servations. It would also be important to have detailed price data on a dis-
aggregated set of commodities. These data would need to cover the most re-
cent two years. Even these data, ideal and unattainable as they are, would
pose signiﬁcant econometric issues due to the nature of the questions
posed. This is because what we want to know is how households in a par-
ticular part of the income distribution behaved in response to price changes,
and even the most sophisticated demand systems typically estimate a util-
ity-consistent demand structure for a representative consumer. Although
with inﬁnite data one could estimate a demand structure for just a particu-
lar decile of the income or wealth distribution, this would be massively in-
eﬃcient. (A topic of future research is the estimation of a utility-consistent
demand system that explicitly accommodates the heterogeneity inherent in
studying how the poor respond to price changes.)
In fact, the data described above simply do not exist.1 The good news,
though, is that reality is less removed from this ideal than is usually the case.
Indonesian data sources are in fact quite good. Indonesia conducts an ex-
tensive household consumption survey (SUSENAS) covering on the order
of 50,000 households. Most recently, these surveys have been conducted in
1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1993.2 Although the surveys are large, they are
not panels. That is, there is no systematic eﬀort to track the same households
over time. These surveys cover a wide geographic range of the country and
contain very detailed consumption data.3 The data do not contain prices,
however. Rather, the data contain unit values that are deﬁned as expenditure
divided by quantity. These unit values may diﬀer across households that in
fact face identical prices due to diﬀerences in the quality of the households’
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1. A special wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey was conducted in late 1998 to inves-
tigate the immediate eﬀects of the crisis. This data set, a true panel of households, can compare
household consumption in late 1998 to a corresponding period one year earlier. Frankenberg,
Thomas, and Beegle (1999) summarize the initial ﬁndings. The study surveys 1,900 households
in seven provinces and thus does not provide the geographic coverage or sample size suitable
for our purposes.
2. A survey was also conducted in 1996, but we have not been provided with those data yet.
3. For 203 individual food items, the survey recorded the quantity and value consumed by
the household in the last week. For 89 individual and aggregate nonfood items, the survey
recorded annual expenditures as well as expenditures in the month preceding the survey. For
those households that consumed their own self-produced food, the survey imputed the value
of that food. For those households that owned housing, SUSENAS imputed a monthly rental
payment.consumption. (I.e., although all households in a village may face the same
prices for high-quality and low-quality rice, the unit values recorded for a
household that bought mostly high-quality rice will be higher than the unit
values recorded for the household that bought mostly low-quality rice.) This
type of data can be (and in fact has been) used to estimate demand elastici-
ties exploiting the spatial variation in the data using methods developed by
Deaton (1988). We base our analysis on consumption data from the 1993
SUSENAS, the most recent wave available to us. The 1993 SUSENAS sur-
veyed 65,600 households throughout the entire country. We have reduced
our sample to the 58,100 households that have suﬃcient consumption and
household information for the analysis that follows. To the extent that con-
sumption patterns change over time, we are concerned about the accuracy
of using 1993 consumption data to measure behavior in 1997. We investi-
gate this by examining expenditure patterns as they evolved over the course
of prior waves of the SUSENAS. We found some deﬁnite trends. In partic-
ular, the proportion of expenditure on food decreases slightly but steadily
across each SUSENAS. This is probably due to rising real incomes. These
trends may have persisted until 1997. To the extent that our consumption
baskets are calculated with 1993 and not 1997 data, our measured impacts
of the crisis will diverge from the actual impacts. However, one of our pri-
mary concerns is to highlight the heterogeneous eﬀects of the crisis among
households. The relative consumption baskets (among rich and poor
households, or rural and urban households) did not change as much as the
absolute consumption baskets over the 1993–97 period, and, consequently,
the bias along this dimension is likely to be slight.
We also have very recent price data that have been supplied by the Badan
Pusat Statistik (BPS). The price data contain monthly price observations
for forty-four cities throughout the country over the period January 1997 to
October 1998. This time period, which begins before the advent of the cri-
sis, spans the steep devaluation of the rupiah and subsequent stabilization
at the new higher rate. We employ a single price change measure: the per-
cent change in prices from January 1997 to October 1998. By adopting such
a long time period, from before the onset of rapid inﬂation until after the in-
ﬂation had largely abated, we hope to capture a robust measure of the price
changes brought on by the crisis.
The price data supply price information for both aggregate goods, such
as food or housing, and individual goods, such as cassava or petrol. There
are approximately 700 goods with observed prices in the data. However, the
type of goods observed varies by city, perhaps reﬂecting taste and con-
sumption heterogeneity throughout the country. On average, a particular
city has price information on about 350 goods. Jakarta has as many as 440
goods listed, whereas some small cities only have price information for 300
goods.
Each of the twenty-seven Indonesian provinces is represented by at least
398 James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed Friedmanone city in the price data. In order to match households from the SUSE-
NAS data to as local a price change as possible, we calculate province-
speciﬁc price changes from the city-level data. For those provinces that have
only one provincial city in the price data, we take those price changes as rep-
resentative of the whole province. For those provinces with more than one
city in the price data, we calculate an average provincial price change using
city-speciﬁc 1996 population weights.
The accuracy of this extrapolation of city price data to an entire province
will surely vary with the size and characteristics of the province considered.
For example, Jakarta, the national capital, is also its own province, and the
observed price changes may fairly accurately represent the price changes
faced by residents throughout the province. On the other hand, the price
changes for Irian Jaya, a vast mountainous province, are based on price
changes observed in the provincial capital, Jayapura. Price changes in the
provincial capital may not be a completely accurate proxy for price
changes in remote rural areas. Indeed, a recent study suggests that overall
inﬂation in rural areas is approximately 5 percent higher than in urban ar-
eas (Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle 1999).4 We frequently report sepa-
rate results for the urban and rural poor, and the fact that the price data
were collected in the cities should be kept in mind as those results are re-
viewed.
For certain groups of goods the price data are more disaggregated than
the consumption data reported in the SUSENAS. In order to link the new
price data with the existing consumption data, we use the prices for those
commodities that appear in both the price data set and the SUSENAS. In
some cases, we also aggregate commodities in the price data to match a
product category in the SUSENAS data.5The match between the price data
and the consumption data is good, but not perfect. We ﬁnd that we have de-
tailed price data for most, but not all, of the goods that comprise a house-
hold’s total expenditure. On average, expenditures on matched goods ac-
count for 75 percent of a household’s total expenditure. We return to this
point later.
12.4 Methodologies
Given our data sources, the usual approach to investigating how the In-
donesian poor were aﬀected by the recent crisis would be to do the follow-
ing. First, one would estimate a demand system, ideally one based on an
underlying utility-consistent framework. The SUSENAS surveys would
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4. The same study also presents some evidence that the BPS price data may understate in-
ﬂation by as much as 15 percent. To the extent that this is true, the impact of the crisis is even
greater than measured here.
5. In these cases, we take simple averages of the products that comprise a single product in
the SUSENAS data.provide the data for such a demand system. Based on the estimated elastic-
ities from that demand system, one would then estimate the welfare impact
of the price changes that occurred recently in Indonesia. Special emphasis
would be placed on how the poor were impacted by the crisis. It turns out
that there are some very severe problems with this approach, given the data
and the policy goals. In order to better motivate what we do do, we ﬁrst
highlight the problems with the approach outlined above.
Estimating demand elasticities from the SUSENAS is not an especially
satisfying endeavor. The SUSENAS is a cross-sectional survey of house-
holds. Although we do have multiple waves, there is no panel, or time series,
nature to the data. As noted above, the SUSENAS contains data on expen-
ditures and on quantities consumed, but not on prices. Expenditures divided
by quantities give unit values, and, as outlined in Deaton (1988), there is a
misguided temptation to use these unit values as prices. As noted earlier, a
naive swap between unit values and prices is wrong because unit values re-
ﬂect the quality of the product as well as the market price. Deaton shows that
under the appropriate separability conditions, one can exploit the spatial na-
ture of the data to back out the true price elasticities. The idea is that within
a geographic unit—say, a village—the prices will be the same, although they
are unobserved by the econometrician. Unit values, however,  will diﬀer
across households within the village. This within variation allows the econo-
metrician to identify the quality eﬀect: incomes vary and the observed unit
values vary, but, by assumption, underlying prices are the same. The varia-
tion across villages, controlling for village ﬁxed eﬀects, allows one to then
back out the true price elasticities, because the real price variation occurs
only through the spatial dimension. All of this leads to a multistep estimation
algorithm developed by Deaton (1988). The estimator employed deals quite
carefully with the errors-in-variables issues that the use of unit values raises.
So what’s the problem? This methodology is probably the best available,
but it has some real drawbacks. From an economic perspective, it is trou-
bling that the resulting demand elasticities are not consistent with an under-
lying utility framework. If at the end of the day one wants to compute a wel-
fare measure such as compensating or equivalent variation, one needs to
work with a framework that allows one to identify the primitives of the
underlying utility function. From an econometric perspective, it is prob-
lematic that the methodology does not deal with the endogeneity of prod-
uct quality. Consumers choose the quality as well as quantity of the prod-
ucts bought, and this induces the usual simultaneity concerns. These issues,
though, are perhaps just academic quibbles. The bigger problems arise due
to the policy application at hand. Recall that we are concerned with better
understanding how the price changes aﬀected the poor. There are at least
three reasons that the methodology is ill suited to adequately addressing
this concern. First, the estimated elasticities are essentially local approxi-
mations based on consumer behavior at the observed prices. Hence, the
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a price change on the order of 5 percent. When the price changes under con-
sideration are instead on the order of 100 to 300 percent, the answer is es-
sentially dictated by the choice of functional forms. This is troubling for
most any parametric approach to the estimation of demand elasticities.
Second, the underlying framework is one of a representative consumer. Our
concern, though, is with anything but the representative consumer. Rather,
we are especially focused on the very poor. F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that the
rich are diﬀerent. So, we suspect, are the poor. A demand system that ex-
plicitly considers consumer heterogeneity is called for, but this is not cur-
rently available. Finally, it is not feasible to estimate a complete demand sys-
tem at a highly disaggregated product level. There are simply too many
products. The obvious solution is to aggregate products, but this aggrega-
tion hides very important variation in consumption patterns and price
changes. Alternatively, one can estimate own-price elasticities (but not
cross-price elasticities) for many disaggregated products.
We have done such an exercise with the SUSENAS data. Employing a
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) framework, and controlling for some
observed household characteristics, we have estimated own-price elastici-
ties for individual food items. We do not attempt to correct for the quality
eﬀects discussed above. The elasticities, identiﬁed by the cross-sectional
variation in unit values and quantities, yield the expected negative coeﬃ-
cients and are quite precisely estimated. For example, we estimated the
own-price elasticity for rice to be –0.43 with a standard error of 0.02, and
the same estimate for ground coﬀee yields a coeﬃcient of –0.84 with a stan-
dard error of 0.01. Most of the point estimates for the 193 food items fall be-
tween –0.3 and –0.8. Only a handful of estimates exceed –1, perhaps indi-
cating relatively inelastic demand even at the most disaggregate level. When
the analysis includes ﬁxed eﬀects for each district (kabupaten), the point es-
timates, still precisely estimated, tend to be a bit larger in absolute value, but
still very few exceed an estimate of –1.6Of course, these estimated own-price
elasticities, like most parametric approaches, are subject to some of the
problems mentioned above.
Our principal approach in this paper is nonparametric. As with the
econometric approach outlined above, we will need to assume that the 1993
SUSENAS survey provides a reasonably accurate picture of consumption
patterns before the crisis. We then use the price changes that actually oc-
curred to predict who the price changes would have aﬀected. This approach
has both advantages and disadvantages. On the up side, it does not rely on
functional forms, and we can more easily explore the three types of hetero-
geneity listed above. On the down side, it essentially ignores the possibility
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6. A positive correlation between unobserved quality and price might also bias our estimates
toward zero.of substituting away from relatively more expensive goods. Consequently,
our method will provide an upper bound on the predicted impacts of the
price changes on the poor. The best approach is to combine the hetero-
geneity highlighted with the nonparametric approach with the structural
economic relationships estimated by the econometric approach. We will do
this, and this exercise has convinced us of the need to do this, but it is a
longer-term project.
12.5 Heterogeneity
Our methods are motivated by our desire to capture the heterogeneity in
prices, products, and consumers. We begin our analysis by simply docu-
menting the extent of this heterogeneity. This serves two functions. First, it
illustrates the importance of using methods that do not aggregate across the
dimensions of heterogeneity. Second, it highlights exactly which sorts of
heterogeneity are most important, and this will inform our analysis of the
price changes.
12.5.1 Price Heterogeneity across Regions
We begin by analyzing how prices for narrowly deﬁned products vary
across Indonesia over the course of the ﬁnancial crisis. The raw data that are
used for this exercise are monthly prices for about 700 products that are col-
lected on a city basis by the BPS. These data are then used to create the oﬃ-
cial CPIs for the entire country. Monthly prices for so many products in
very many cities constitute a rather unwieldly data set. We have aggregated
the data in three dimensions. In terms of the time series dimension, we
simply computed the price change for each product for the period span-
ning January 1997 to October 1998. Hence, the twenty-two monthly price
changes were reduced to one price change that spanned from before the cri-
sis to the most recent data. This simpliﬁcation is not without costs, for the
reduced data set is no longer able to address questions about the timing of
price changes across provinces. It may have taken more time for price in-
creases to have occurred in the more distant provinces, and this sort of in-
formation is no longer retrievable with the reduced data set. In the geo-
graphic dimension, we have aggregated to create price series for each of
twenty-seven provinces, as explained above. In the product dimension, for
some analysis we have collapsed the 700 or so products into approximately
180 products or aggregates that we are able to match with goods in the con-
sumption data (SUSENAS).
The price data are reported in levels, but we focus our analysis in this pa-
per on changes. There is little doubt that some places are more expensive
to live in than others. Our interest, however, is whether the ﬁnancial crisis
had a diﬀerential impact on diﬀerent regions of Indonesia. Hence, price
changes seem the appropriate focus.
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ographically diﬀerential impacts ﬁnds some empirical support in ongoing
work by Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett at the World Bank in their work-
ing paper “Social Impacts of the Indonesian Crisis: New Data and Policy
Implications” (1999). Relying on data sources diﬀerent from those used in
this paper, Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett found that the geographic im-
pact of the crisis on poverty was quite uneven. We return to these results in
section 12.6 where we evaluate the impact of the crisis on the poor.
The geographic pattern of price increases diﬀers according to the speci-
ﬁcity of the products considered. At the most general level, the price index
encompassing all goods does not show much regional variation. An un-
weighted average of the general price index for each province shows that
prices increased an average of 92.5 percent from January 1997 to October
1998. The general price index on a province-by-province basis ranged from
an increase of 70 percent in Nusa Tenggara Timor (NTT) to an increase of
119 percent in East Java. As a baseline, the standard error of the series of
provincial general price indexes is about 11 percent. Figure 12.1 shows the
empirical distribution of the provincial general price index increases. As
noted above, it varies from 70 percent to 120 percent, and most provinces
are in the 80–100 percent range. Given the diﬀerent consumption patterns
across provinces across provinces and the geographic separation of many
provinces, this does not seem like very much heterogeneity. However, this is
deceiving.
There are 184 products and product aggregates that appear in both the
SUSENAS and our price data. We have computed the change in the price
index for all of them. The standard error of the change in the price index, as
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Fig. 12.1 Provincial variation in the CPIone looks across provinces, is greater than 11 percent (that of the general
price index) in over 170 of them. There are some extreme examples, but one
that is more representative and is especially important is the geographic
dispersion of the price increase for rice. Figure 12.2shows the empirical dis-
tribution of the percentage changes in the price of rice. It varies from
around 110 percent (in South Sumatra) to around 280 percent (in South
and Central Kalimantan.) The fact that the price increases of individual
products show much more geographic variation than that of the overall
price index means that the price increases of products covary negatively
across provinces. Loosely speaking, when the price of one product goes up
a lot in a province, the price of another product goes up by less, so that the
increase in the general price index is not that diﬀerent across provinces.7
The substantial geographic variation of price increases following the
ﬁnancial crisis has economic implications. Suppose the poor consume a
similar basket of goods regardless of where they live. In such a case, the
economic impact of the crisis on the poor may vary substantially across
regions. For example, if the poor always devote a substantial share of their
budget to rice, the poor would have been much more adversely aﬀected in
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Fig. 12.2 Provincial variation in rice prices
7. An alternative explanation, which we have investigated and rejected, is somewhat more
complicated. There are about 700 products that comprise the overall price index. Not all of
these appear in the SUSENAS consumption data. It could have been the case that the prod-
ucts that contribute to the general price index but do not appear in our consumption data con-
tribute to the dampening of the variance of the general price index. This would happen if the
excluded products had price increases that negatively covaried with the included products. We
have gone back and investigated this possibility using all 700 prices, and, although there is
some negative covariance between the price increases of included and excluded products, it is
modest and does not explain the dampened variance of the province-level general price index.South and Central Kalimantan than in Sumatra. Alternatively, if the poor
consume very diﬀerent baskets of goods in diﬀerent regions, spatial price
variation may in fact be coupled with a fairly uniform impact of the crisis
on the poor. Further, if the poor are not evenly distributed across the
provinces (and they are not), the geographic variation in prices has an ad-
ditional impact that can serve to either alleviate or exacerbate the impact of
the crisis on the poor.8
12.5.2 Product Heterogeneity across Product Aggregates
The previous subsection documented the spatial variation of prices. The
general price index did not vary that much across provinces, but the prices
of individual goods did. This ﬁnding has implications for product aggrega-
tion. If one wishes to estimate a demand system, some product aggregation
is necessary. It is simply too hard to estimate a demand system for 184
(much less the original 700!) products complete with the all-important
cross-price elasticities. One common practice is to aggregate products into
groups such as food, housing, clothing, and the like. One can then estimate
a demand system using the aggregated products. This is a relatively attrac-
tive option when the products that underlie the aggregate have price
changes that are somewhat uniform. That is simply not the case in the In-
donesian data. In this section, we document this ﬁnding and explain some
economic implications of product heterogeneity across product aggregates.
Like the spatial heterogeneity documented in the previous section, this type
of heterogeneity also informs the methodology we use to investigate the im-
pact of the crisis on the poor.
The price data have seven aggregate commodities, which in turn sum to the
general price index. These aggregates are foodstuﬀs, prepared food, housing,
clothing, health services, transportation, and education and recreation. Each
of these is comprised of many individual products. The degree of disaggre-
gation varies. There are 262 individual items under “foodstuﬀs,” whereas
there only about 40 or 50 for “health services” and for “transportation.”
In order to abstract from heterogeneity across provinces and focus on the
heterogeneity at the product level, we ﬁrst collapse the data set and consider
only the average price increase for each product when the average is taken
across provinces. Hence, we compute the average increase in the price of the
aggregate “foodstuﬀ” as well as the average price increase in each of the 262
goods that comprise that aggregate. This removes the spatial dimension of
the data. Figure 12.3graphically illustrates the heterogeneity of the price in-
creases of the products that comprise the aggregate for foodstuﬀs. In ﬁgure
12.3, one notes that although one or two products had either price decreases
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8. The spatial variation in price changes might in principle help to econometrically identify
demand elasticities, but this would require concurrent (and unavailable) data on household ex-
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Fig. 12.3 Variation in food prices across products
Table 12.2 Product Heterogeneity
Average Standard Minimum Maximum
Number of Price Deviation of Price Price
Product Individual Increase Price Increases Increase Increase
Aggregate Products (%) (%) (%) (%)
Foodstuffs 262 112.8 80.5 –68.3 612
Prepared foods 72 78.4 41.6 0.04 169
Housing 105 107.7 76.4 0.4 499
Clothing 94 80.3 46.4 –0.04 214
Health services 38 85.8 51.2 0.0 263
Transportation 48 77.3 84.1 –0.13 482
Education & 
recreation 43 73.1 71.5 –9.70 310
Notes: Price increases are from January 1997 through October 1998. Average price increases are com-
puted as the average across all provinces reporting price data for a given good.
greater than 50 percent or price increases greater than 400 percent, most
products had price increases in the zero to 200 percent range. The results of
this aggregation across provinces for all product categories are provided in
table 12.2.
Table 12.2 lists, for each of the seven aggregates, the number of individ-
ual products, the average price increase when the average is taken across all
the products that comprise the aggregate, the standard deviation of the
price increases, and the minimum and maximum price increase. (One
should keep in mind that these standard deviations do not account for the
regional variation in price increases, only the variation of the average price
increases.) For example, there are 262 products that comprise the aggregate“foodstuﬀs.” Of these 262 products, one had an average price decrease of
about 68 percent (a leafy vegetable that deﬁes English translation), whereas
one had an average increase of over 600 percent (red onions). Of all food-
stuﬀs, the average price increase was 114 percent, and the standard devia-
tion of the price increase was about 80 percent. There was, in sum, tremen-
dous variation in the average price changes of individual food items. This
pattern holds for all of the aggregate commodities.
Once we have abstracted from spatial price variation, we have seen that
how much prices increase depends on the degree of aggregation with which
we deﬁne a product. This too has economic implications. Consider food-
stuﬀs as an example. If poor households consume a diﬀerent basket of spe-
ciﬁc food items than do the nonpoor, the poor may be quite diﬀerentially
aﬀected by the crisis. Perhaps the food items whose prices skyrocketed most
were imported luxury items, whereas the price rise for basic stables was
more modest. Using an aggregate for foods will hide this important source
of heterogeneity. This reasoning suggests that one should examine the im-
pact of the crisis at the most disaggregated level. There is, however, a line of
reasoning that works in the opposite direction. The methodology we use to
investigate the impact of the crisis on the poor essentially assumes that there
is no substitutability among goods (this is discussed in some detail below).
Although the assumption of perfectly inelastic demands is clearly not cor-
rect, it is less incorrect as goods are more broadly deﬁned. For these com-
peting reasons, we analyze the impact of the crisis at diﬀerent levels of prod-
uct aggregation.
12.5.3 Heterogeneity across Households
The above two subsections have documented the heterogeneity of prices
across provinces and within product aggregates. The purpose of this sub-
section is to illustrate the heterogeneity of households in the sample. One
can either do this correctly, and write the ensuing book, or be too brief,
while giving a glimpse into relevant dimensions of household heterogeneity.
Our choice will be obvious.
Table 12.3 quantiﬁes how a handful of household characteristics vary
across the population, both overall and by income groups. The ﬁrst column
gives the (weighted)9 means of per capita household income, expenditure,
whether the head of the household had completed secondary school, the
size of the household, the budget share of food in total expenditure, whether
the household was rural, and the age of the household head. Means are re-
ported for three separate deciles in the income distribution, as well as the
overall sample. The sample is made up of the 58,100 households (from
SUSENAS) included in the subsequent analysis.
Table 12.3 indicates that income is quite unequally distributed, as the aver-
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Table 12.3 Household Heterogeneity
Bottom Decile Middle Decile Top Decile Overall
Per capita income 19,241 51,959 229,097 61,596
(3,916) (2,411) (74,424) (218,335)
Per capita expenditure 21,687 46,028 136,271 49,726
(11,342) (10,985) (91,594) (41,859)
Schooling 0.2526 0.5097 0.7628 0.4734
(0.4345) (0.4999) (0.4253) (0.4993)
Household size 4.3958 3.7722 3.6142 3.8911
(1.6940) (1.6500) (1.7225) (1.6911)
Food share of income 0.83483 0.5569 0.3233 0.5824
(1.3818) (0.1375) (0.1462) (0.5182)
Rural 0.9222 0.6767 0.3042 0.6959
(0.2678) (0.4677) (0.4601) (0.4600)
Age of household head 47.877 43.828 43.147 45.000
(13.714) (13.980) (13.467) (13.910)
Number of households 5,811 5,811 5,811 58,100
Source: 1993 SUSENAS.
Notes: Deciles are by per capita household income. The middle decile includes households with per
capita incomes between the 50th and 60th percentile. All means are weighted by population sampling
weights. Household size is deﬁned as number of adults plus one-half the number of children under ten.
Income and expenditure values are in current (1993) rupiahs.
age income at the top decile is almost twelve times that of the bottom decile.
Expenditure is less unequally distributed. Only about 25 percent of the very
poor household heads have graduated secondary school, whereas almost 75
percent of those in the top decile have done so. Richer households are smaller.
(We have deﬁned household size as the number of adults plus one-half times
the number of children.) About 90 percent of the households in the bottom
decile are rural, whereas about 70 percent of those in the top decile are urban.
Households in the bottom decile devote about 85 percent of their income to
food, whereas those in the top devote only a bit more than one-third of that
share. As noted in table 12.1, the CPI for food rose by more than the CPI for
other categories, and this alone suggests that at this very aggregated level, the
poor may have been more adversely aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis.
As important as the averages across deciles reported in table 12.3 are the
standard errors of these averages. Even within households in the poorest
decile, there is tremendous variation in the income share devoted to food
consumption, the household size, the age of the head of the household, and
whether the head of the household has completed secondary school. The
very poor are themselves a quite heterogeneous group.
The poorest households do not just spend a larger share of their budget
on food than middle- and high-income households, but, as mentioned ear-
lier, they also purchase a very diﬀerent basket of products. Even within the
category of food, poor households typically buy diﬀerent items from thosewealthier households buy. This is apparent in table 12.4, which presents the
mean expenditure shares for the overall sample as well as for those house-
holds in the top and bottom per capita household income deciles. As ex-
pected, poor households spend a greater share of total expenditures on
food than rich households (68 percent for those in the bottom decile com-
pared with 47 percent in the top decile).10Even within food items, spending
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Table 12.4 Expenditure Shares (%)
Product Bottom Decile Mean Top Decile
Food 68.1 62.2 46.9
Cereals 27.6 17.8 6.9
Rice 24.8 16.7 6.4
Tubers 2.2 1.1 0.4
Cassava 0.7 0.4 0.1
Fish 4.6 5.4 4.4
Meat 0.7 2.2 4.0
Eggs and milk 1.2 2.5 3.5
Chicken eggs 0.8 1.3 1.3
Vegetables 7.3 5.9 3.7
Legumes and soy products 2.8 2.6 1.6
Fruit 1.9 2.5 3.0
Oil and animal fat 3.8 3.1 1.8
Beverages 4.2 3.7 2.4
Sugar 2.7 2.4 1.5
Seasonings 2.6 2.3 1.4
Salt 0.3 0.2 0.1
Ready-made food and beverages 4.2 6.9 8.7
Tobacco and beetle leaf 4.5 5.3 3.9
Filter clove cigarettes 1.1 2.6 2.7
Nonfood 31.9 37.8 53.1
Housing, fuel, lighting, and water 15.8 17.5 22.2
Estimated monthly rent if owned 5.7 7.5 11.8
Electricity 0.7 1.4 2.4
Kerosene 2.7 2.8 1.9
Firewood 5.3 3.0 0.5
Health care 0.9 1.2 1.7
Education 1.4 1.9 3.2
Gasoline (for transport) 0.0 0.6 2.1
Clothing, shores, and hats 6.4 6.2 5.5
Durable goods 1.7 2.7 4.9
Taxes and insurance 0.6 1.0 2.1
Source: 1993 SUSENAS.
Notes: Durable goods include items such as furniture, household utensils, jewelry, and ve-
hicles. Expenditure shares are given as a percentage of total household expenditures. Deciles
are ranked by per capita household income.
10. Because we are now looking at food outlays as a share of total expenditures, and not in-
come, the ﬁgures here will diﬀer from those in table 12.3.patterns vary by income level. The poor spend a far greater share on basic
foodstuﬀs such as cereals and tubers (30 percent of all expenditures) than
the wealthy (7 percent). Indeed, expenditures on rice alone comprise one-
quarter of all expenditures for poor households, compared with 6 percent
for the wealthy. In contrast, the wealthy devote more than twice the expen-
diture share as the poor to meat, eggs and milk, and prepared food and bev-
erages. Among nonfood expenditures, the wealthy devote proportionately
more resources to housing and education and are more reliant on electric-
ity and gasoline (for transport), whereas the poor spend signiﬁcantly higher
proportions on kerosene and ﬁrewood. Because the prices of individual
products do not all move together, the fact that richer and poorer house-
holds buy diﬀerent products suggests that the ﬁnancial crisis may have diﬀ-
erentially aﬀected richer and poorer households in a complicated way. If
one could simply multiply the poor’s consumption basket by some scalar to
get the rich’s consumption basket, untangling the impact of the ﬁnancial
crisis on the poor would be simpler. However, that is not the case.
12.6 Changes in the Cost of Living and the 
Impact of the Crisis on the Poor
The purpose of the previous section has been to establish that (a) price
changes varied a great deal across Indonesian provinces so that where a
household lived may matter when evaluating the impact of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis; (b) price changes varied a great deal depending on how one aggregates
products, so that the degree of disaggregation of product deﬁnition matters
when evaluating the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis; and (c) households them-
selves are very heterogeneous, so a methodology investigating the impact of
the ﬁnancial crisis should accommodate this heterogeneity. With these con-
cerns in mind, we now turn to measuring the impact of the crisis on the poor.
We measure the impact of the crisis on households (rich and poor) by
computing household-level cost-of-living indexes. Because we only have
data on consumption patterns well before the crisis, we use these precrisis
consumption baskets to compute what is essentially a Lespeyres cost-of-
living index for each household. This index provides a maximum bound on
the impact of the crisis, because the index does not take into account the
substitution toward relatively less costly products that surely takes place (to
some extent) after price increases. Denoting the price of good i faced by
household j in time t by p ijt and expenditure shares by qijt, the household
cost-of-living index for household j is given by








410 James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed FriedmanWe compute 58,100 cost-of-living indices, or as many indices as there are
households in our sample.
We actually compute three such household-level indices. The ﬁrst index
that we compute matches the price changes of goods in the price data with
the monthly expenditures of the same goods in the 1993 SUSENAS. For the
monthly expenditure of food items, we simply convert the recorded weekly
expenditures to monthly equivalents. For nonfood items, we use the monthly
average of annual expenditures, and not the expenditures in the month pre-
ceding the survey, in order to more accurately measure monthly expendi-
tures for durables that are infrequently purchased. We attempt to match
goods across the two data sets at the lowest level of aggregation possible. For
the case of food (both raw and prepared), we were able to match 132 diﬀer-
ent individual goods between the two data sets. In the case of nonfood items,
we matched 52 diﬀerent goods, both individual goods, such as ﬁrewood and
kerosene, and aggregate goods, such as toiletries or men’s clothing. Hence,
the i subscript in the Lespeyres formula above runs from 1 to 184. Through
this matching, we were able to account for 75 percent of total household ex-
penditures on average—a little greater for poor households and a little less
for rich ones. This index is, then, an average of the observed price changes,
with each price change weighted by the household-speciﬁc expenditure
share for that good.
The second index is computed for the case in which we use 19 aggregate
commodities instead of the original 184 that we matched between SUSENAS
and the BPS price data. These aggregates include ﬁfteen food categories, such
as cereals and meat, and four nonfood categories, such as housing and cloth-
ing. The motivation for this is twofold. First, recall that the Lespeyres index,
by construction, ignores substitutability across products. By deﬁning prod-
ucts more broadly, as in the second index, we reduce the likely overstatement
of the impact of the crisis. Put another way, when products are broadly de-
ﬁned, those aggregates are going to be less elastically demanded than the dis-
aggregated products. The second motivation for this index stems from the
fact that the disaggregated index only accounted for about 75 percent of
households’ expenditures. It is possible that for many households, the goods
excluded in the ﬁrst index may either exacerbate or mitigate the measured
welfare eﬀects, depending on the relative price changes of those goods. The
expenditures for these aggregates (e.g., meat, cereals, housing, etc.) are also
supplied by the 1993 SUSENAS, and the price changes for these aggregates
are found in the price data. A beneﬁt of this index is that it covers nearly 100
percent of the individual household’s expenditures. Of course, by attempting
to compensate for the above potential biases, we may be introducing another
bias, aggregation bias, which we have also previously discussed.
The third index that we compute accounts for the services provided by
owner-occupied housing and for self-produced agriculture. Many house-
holds, especially in rural areas, own their home. Although the price of hous-
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better oﬀ (they are still living in the same house). However, these house-
holds are better oﬀrelative to those that do not own their home. We account
for the services provided by owner-occupied housing by treating the im-
puted rental value for these homes as a negative expenditure. Many house-
holds produce some of their own food. Over 90 percent of these households
are classiﬁed as rural. Households that consume self-produced foodstuﬀs
also tend to be net exporters of agricultural products.11 As the price of food
rose, the value of their production also increased. Clearly, if the household
was a net exporter of food, the household would beneﬁt from the price in-
crease. To the extent that a household produced some of its own food, such
production would mute the impact of price increases relative to a household
that purchased food in the market. We modify the ﬁrst index to account for
self-produced agricultural products by treating the imputed value of self-
produced food as a negative expenditure.12 Note that this modiﬁed index
will understate the eﬀects of the price increases to the extent that we do not
observe or adjust for price increases of intermediate inputs used in agricul-
tural production. On the other hand, this index does not allow supply re-
sponses to the increased food prices, and one would expect more self-
production in the goods whose relative prices increased the most.
12.6.1 Nonparametric Evidence
Figure 12.4 provides kernel density estimates of the ﬁrst and third in-
dexes. The biggest diﬀerence between the two densities is the existence of
households that are betteroﬀafter the crisis due to the consumption of self-
produced (and now more expensive) agricultural goods. Although there are
not very many of these households (less than 10 percent of the sample), they
are nonnegligible. More generally, including household production muted
the cost-of-living increases, and this was especially true in the rural areas.
Table 12.5 summarizes how the cost-of-living index varied across per
capita household income deciles. This table begins to address the impact of
the crisis on the very poor.13 Because the rapid price change resulting from
the crisis may have diﬀerentially aﬀected rural and urban areas, we report
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11. Fifty-four percent (weighted) of households in the sample report operating an agricul-
tural business. 69 percent (weighted) of those households report income from the sale of agri-
cultural goods.
12. There is a long-standing debate over whether shadow prices in rural households engaged
in agricultural production equate market prices for agricultural inputs such as labor or land.
To the extent that these shadow prices may diverge from market prices, the “valuation” for self-
produced food, based on market prices, will not be entirely accurate. Benjamin (1992) presents
evidence from rural Java that household shadow prices for agricultural inputs such as labor are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from market prices.
13. We use income to measure “poor” and “nonpoor” although we are well aware of the con-
troversy around this deﬁnition. Our results were substantively the same when we looked at ex-
penditure or food-related expenditure instead of income. See Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1994)
for an investigation of the relative merits of these various poverty indicators.Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis 413
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Fig. 12.4 Distribution of the cost of living: A, Index without self-production; 
B, Index with self-production
separate results for rural and urban households. When we do not take into
account self-production and use disaggregated product deﬁnitions (index
1), we ﬁnd that the cost of living for the poorest urban households increased
an average of 128 percent over the January 1997 through October 1998 pe-
riod. The increase for urban households in the top income decile was 89 per-
cent. Among rural households, where the overall cost-of-living increases
were greater, the parallel ﬁgures are 136 percent for the poorest and 107 per-
cent for the wealthiest households. For both rural and urban households,
we ﬁnd that the increase in the cost of living declines monotonically by in-
come decile. Hence, in both areas, the poorer a household was, the greater
was the increase in its cost of living.414 James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed Friedman
Table 12.5 Cost-of-Living Indexes and Income Levels
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
Income Decile Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
1 1.28 1.36 1.25 1.32 1.11 0.73
2 1.26 1.34 1.24 1.30 1.07 0.74
3 1.21 1.32 1.21 1.28 1.06 0.74
4 1.19 1.30 1.19 1.27 1.04 0.75
5 1.14 1.28 1.16 1.25 1.03 0.75
6 1.11 1.26 1.14 1.24 1.01 0.79
7 1.07 1.22 1.12 1.21 0.98 0.81
8 1.03 1.19 1.09 1.19 0.95 0.80
9 0.98 1.14 1.05 1.16 0.91 0.84
10 0.89 1.07 0.99 1.12 0.80 0.83
Overall average 1.19 1.20 0.84
Notes: Price index 1 is computed across all disaggregated commodities and does not take into
account either self-produced agriculture or owner-occupied housing. Price index 2 is com-
puted across about twenty aggregated commodities and does not take into account either self-
produced agriculture or owner-occupied housing. Price index 3 is computed across all disag-
gregated commodities and accounts for both owner-occupied housing and self-produced
goods. Deciles are by per capita household income.
The middle columns of table 12.5 (index 2) use the more aggregated
product deﬁnitions. The results are very similar to those using the disaggre-
gated product deﬁnitions, although the diﬀerences across income deciles
are mitigated, mostly because wealthier households in both areas now have
somewhat higher cost-of-living increases. The overall similarities between
the two indexes are striking, given that index 2 employs broadly aggregate
goods demanded less elastically than the individual goods of index 1. Thus,
while the Lespeyres index is, by construction, an overestimate of the true
change in the cost of living, the bias may not be huge. Indeed, the averages
of the ﬁrst and second indexes are almost identical. It remains the case that
the poorer households saw their cost of living increase by more than did
wealthier households.
The ﬁnal two columns of table 12.5 now account for housing services and
self-produced food. As suggested by the kernel density estimates in ﬁgure
12.4, the increases in the cost of living are substantially muted relative to the
ﬁgures for index 1 in both areas, although this is especially true for rural
households due to the tendency of rural households to engage in agricul-
tural production. The average increase falls from 120 percent in index 1 to
84 percent. (In results not reported here, we ﬁnd that it is indeed self-
produced agriculture and not owner-occupied housing that accounts for
most of the diﬀerence between the indexes.) Interestingly, for rural house-
holds there is no longer a diﬀerential impact across the income spectrum.
Indeed, the cost-of-living increase is now slightly greater for the wealthier
rural households, suggesting that self-production has equalized the impactof the ﬁnancial crisis across the income deciles in rural areas. The story is
quite diﬀerent for urban households, however, where there is still a clear
monotonic decrease in the changes in cost of living. The cost of living for
the poorest urban households increased 111 percent, whereas the wealthi-
est households faced an increase of only 80 percent. It is important to note
that the cost of living increases for the wealthy urbanhouseholds are greater
than those measured for the poor or median rural households. Thus, this in-
dex suggests the impacts of the crisis have been greater for urban areas than
for rural, and greatest overall for the urban poor.
We turn now from variation across household income to the regional
variation in the cost-of-living indices. Table 12.6 gives the change in the
cost-of-living index for urban and rural households in each province. As an
example, using index 1 (disaggregated products and no correction for hous-
ing services or self-production), the cost of living for urban households in
Aceh increased 102 percent, while for rural households it increased 125 per-
cent. For most provinces, index 1 and index 2 (with aggregated products)
give similar results. As in table 12.5, we ﬁnd that when we do not account
for housing services and self-production, rural households consistently
faced greater increases in their cost of living than did their provincial urban
counterparts. Our index 1 results suggest that there was substantial regional
variation in the cost of living. In Irian Jaya, to the far east, the increase in
urban cost of living measured 75 percent, whereas in southeast Sulawesi,
the increase was 138 percent. The regional variation for rural households is
equally dramatic. In southeast Sulawesi, rural households faced a 161 per-
cent cost-of-living increase, whereas in Irian Jaya the increase was only 91
percent.
When we focus on an index that accounts for housing services and self-
produced agriculture (index 3), the regional variation remains, but the ur-
ban-rural comparison is changed. The depreciation of the rupiah helped ex-
port-oriented provinces, and the increased cost of food was oﬀset by
household production in rural areas. In every province, rural households
faced a smaller increase in their cost-of-living index than did their urban
counterparts. In some provinces, the diﬀerences are especially large. In East
Timor and Irian Jaya, the cost of living for rural households only increased
about 39 percent. The pattern of regional variation remains, because other
provinces had increases (for rural households) more than double that.
We view the particular results for some provinces with some caution be-
cause our results do not always coincide with the results reported by Pop-
pele, Sumarto, and Pritchett (1999). For example, they report that on Su-
lawesi, 70 percent of rural Kecamatans reported that things were better in
August 1998 than they were one year prior. Although these measures are
subjective, this ﬁgure is hard to reconcile with our cost-of-living changes.
Overall, the Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett results suggest substantial re-
gional variation (as do we) and that rural households fared relatively better
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Province Region Type Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
Aceh Urban 1.02 1.10 0.98
Rural 1.25 1.25 0.63
North Sumatra Urban 1.13 1.18 1.05
Rural 1.39 1.36 0.87
West Sumatra Urban 1.02 1.12 0.85
Rural 1.26 1.26 0.64
Riau Urban 0.94 1.04 0.90
Rural 1.14 1.14 0.85
Jambi Urban 1.00 0.99 0.95
Rural 1.24 1.16 0.78
Bengkulu Urban 1.18 1.29 1.10
Rural 1.52 1.51 1.09
South Sumatra Urban 1.06 1.16 0.96
Rural 1.31 1.31 0.63
Lampung Urban 0.98 1.11 0.85
Rural 1.17 1.18 0.69
Jakarta Urban 0.93 1.01 0.87
Rural n.a. n.a. n.a.
West Java Urban 1.06 1.12 0.93
Rural 1.21 1.23 0.67
Central Java Urban 1.05 1.06 0.96
Rural 1.18 1.16 0.78
Yogyakarta Urban 1.15 1.14 0.92
Rural 1.36 1.23 0.80
East Java Urban 1.13 1.17 0.97
Rural 1.33 1.29 0.98
Bali Urban 1.08 1.10 0.97
Rural 1.29 1.27 0.95
NTB Urban 1.25 1.22 1.14
Rural 1.50 1.41 1.01
NTT Urban 0.84 0.85 0.74
Rural 0.98 1.02 0.09
East Timor Urban 0.92 1.06 0.83
Rural 1.02 1.07 0.39
West Kalimantan Urban 1.10 1.26 0.98
Rural 1.49 1.53 0.76
Central Kalimantan Urban 1.09 1.14 1.03
Rural 1.43 1.37 0.71
South Kalimantan Urban 1.13 1.12 1.07
Rural 1.45 1.28 0.85
East Kalimantan Urban 0.90 1.02 0.83
Rural 1.14 1.18 0.80
North Sulawesi Urban 1.05 1.04 0.98
Rural 1.23 1.14 0.88
Central Sulawesi Urban 1.21 1.23 1.10
Rural 1.52 1.40 0.70
South Sulawesi Urban 0.93 1.00 0.84
Rural 1.09 1.13 0.42(as do we once we account for household production). These general ﬁnd-
ings are also echoed in Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999).
It might be interesting to investigate how the provincial and regional
changes in the cost of living reported here vary with other provincial char-
acteristics such as mean income or expenditure levels. Have wealthier or
poorer regions of the country experienced higher cost-of-living increases?
For rural areas, there is little correlation between mean per capita house-
hold income or expenditures and increases in mean cost of living. However,
for urban areas the cost-of-living changes are negatively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with provincial mean household income (and, to a lesser extent,
expenditures). Thus, urban areas with lower average household income ex-
perienced greater price changes than the more wealthy cities. These ﬁndings
hold true for any of the three indexes. Another provincial characteristic
more sensitive to the distribution of income within the province is the
provincial population share categorized as poor. What might be the relation
between regional variation in price changes and regional variation in
poverty? We take as our poverty measure the population share deemed poor
by Bidani and Ravallion (1993) from calculations based on the 1990 SUSE-
NAS. Although these poverty indicators pertain to a period seven years be-
fore the currency crisis, it is unlikely that the relative variation in regional
poverty proﬁles would be much changed in the intervening years. We ﬁnd
no relation between the provincial cost-of-living increases and the provin-
cial poverty indicators for urban areas. We also ﬁnd no relation between
cost-of-living changes and poverty indicators in rural areas when our cost
of living is measured by index 1 or index 2.14 However, the cost-of-living
changes as determined by index 3 are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated
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Table 12.6 (continued)
Province Region Type Index 1 Index 2 Index 3
Southeast Sulawesi Urban 1.38 1.37 1.3
Rural 1.61 1.54 0.98
Maluku Urban 0.95 1.06 0.90
Rural 1.19 1.22 0.61
Irian Jaya Urban 0.75 0.81 0.67
Rural 0.91 0.89 0.38
Notes: Price index 1 is computed across all disaggregated commodities and does not take into
account either self-produced agriculture or owner-occupied housing. Price index 2 is com-
puted across about twenty aggregated commodities and does not take into account either self-
produced agriculture or owner-occupied housing. Price index 3 is computed across all disag-
gregated commodities and accounts for both owner-occupied housing and self-produced
goods. n.a. = not applicable.
14. Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett (1999), using diﬀerent poverty measures, also ﬁnd no
association across regions between the impacts of the crisis and precrisis levels of poverty.with the share of rural provincial population deemed poor. Hence,
provinces with a greater proportion of poor experienced lower cost-of-
living increases than the more well-oﬀ rural areas once adjustments for
agricultural self-production were made.
12.6.2 Parametric Evidence
The results in tables 12.5 and 12.6 suggest that the crisis aﬀected the cost
of living of the poor more than that of the rich, at least for indexes 1 and 2,
and urban households more than rural ones, after we account for owned
housing and self-produced food. In order to investigate how the cost of liv-
ing varies conditional on more than one household attribute, regression
analysis is helpful. Our approach is simple and descriptive. It is without
structural interpretation.
Regression results are summarized in table 12.7.15 The top half of table
12.7 includes results using the cost-of-living index that does notaccount for
housing services or self-produced food. We include three speciﬁcations and
two estimation methods. All speciﬁcations are linear, with the index being
regressed on two to four explanatory variables. In each speciﬁcation, we in-
clude the log of income and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
418 James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed Friedman
Table 12.7 Cost-of-Living Regressions
Independent Fixed Fixed Fixed
Variable OLS Effects OLS Effects OLS Effects
Dependant Variable: Index 1 (Index without Housing or Self-Production)
ln(Income) –0.100 –0.098 –0.151 –0.154 –0.146 –0.150
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural0 .163 0.158 0.141 0.138 0.138 0.135
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ln(Size) 0.143 0.147 0.142 0.146
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Degree –0.023 –0.019
(0.001) (0.001)
Dependent Variable: Index 3 (Index with Housing and Self-Production)
ln(Income) –0.046 –0.028 –0.046 –0.029 –0.049 –0.031
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rural– 0.214 –0.201 –0.214 –0.201 –0.212 –0.199
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Size) –0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Degree 0.014 0.012
(0.004) (0.004)
Note: Regressions had approximately 58,000 observations.
15. The regressions reported in table 12.7 are not weighted by sampling weights, but we ﬁnd
that doing so makes little to no substantive diﬀerence in the results.household is rural. (We use the actual index instead of its log because the in-
dex when accounting for self-production may be negative.) In the most par-
simonious speciﬁcation, OLS yields a coeﬃcient of –0.100 on log income
and 0.163 on the rural dummy variable. Each is quite precisely estimated.
The coeﬃcient on log income has a natural interpretation. The negative
sign on the coeﬃcient indicates that the cost of living rises with declines in
income. The poor are harmed most. A value of –0.100 indicates that as in-
come doubles (a 100 percent increase), the cost-of-living index falls by 10
points (0.10). The coeﬃcient of –0.10 is large when considered in conjunc-
tion with the range of incomes. At the 10th percentile, household income is
75,802, whereas it is only 101,667 at the 20th percentile. At the 80th and
90th percentiles, income is 324,167 and 460,656. These large absolute
diﬀerences translate into large diﬀerences in the cost of living. Because in-
come is easily ﬁve times larger at the high end of the distribution than at the
low end, the –0.100 coeﬃcient corresponds to a cost-of-living index that is
50 points higher for poor households. This strikes us as a large disparity in
the cost of living. The coeﬃcient on “rural,” still in the simplest OLS spec-
iﬁcation, is 0.163, indicating that rural households have a cost-of-living in-
crease 16 points higher than their urban counterparts. Recall, though, that
this result is for the index that does not account for self-production.
Our main focus is on how robust these results are to other speciﬁcations.
Because we are not being guided by theory, the decision of which other re-
gressors might be included in the regression is essentially arbitrary. Insofar
as included regressors might covary with income or rural location, the co-
eﬃcients on log income and the rural dummy might change. We include two
additional regressors. One is the log of household size, where children un-
der ten are counted as one-half and adults as one. The other included vari-
able (“degree”) is a dummy variable set to 1 if the head of the household is
a secondary school graduate. We ﬁnd that the inclusion of household size
increases (in absolute value) the coeﬃcient on log income to –0.151. The co-
eﬃcient on the rural dummy remains relatively stable. Household size itself
conditionally covaries positively with the price index. Larger households
face larger cost-of-living increases. Controlling also for the education of the
head of the household has virtually no impact on the other coeﬃcients.
There is good reason to believe that the residuals of the regression may be
correlated by province. This would be consistent with the substantial re-
gional variation that we found in earlier cuts of the data. Provinces seem to
matter. For this reason, we estimated all speciﬁcations with a province ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator. This eﬀectively sweeps out any cross-province variation,
so the estimates instead capture only within-province variation. We ﬁnd
that the inclusion of province ﬁxed eﬀects makes remarkably little diﬀer-
ence to the estimates. All coeﬃcients are about the same as with OLS. Put
another way, the variation in the data that gave rise to the OLS estimates
also exists at the province level.
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counts for housing services and self-produced agriculture (index 3). The re-
sults are broadly consistent with those in tables 12.5 and 12.6. We focus ﬁrst
on the OLS estimates. In our most parsimonious speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on log income is –0.046, and the coeﬃcient on the rural
dummy variable is –0.214. Hence, if household income doubles, the cost of
living decreases 4 points. Because income at the 10th percentile is about
one-sixth of that at the 90th percentile, these results indicate that the cost of
living is about 25 points (0.25) higher for the very poor. This is a large diﬀer-
ence, because the mean of the cost-of-living index is only 0.83. The OLS co-
eﬃcient on log income is stable across speciﬁcations and is always precisely
estimated. The coeﬃcients on log income are always smaller with the index
that includes self-production, and this is consistent with the notion that
self-production mutes the impact of the crisis on the poor. It remains the
case, though, that the poor are more adversely aﬀected than the wealthy.
When we include housing services and self-production, the coeﬃcient on
the rural dummy variable becomes negative. Hence, when we account for
these inﬂuences, urban households faced a higher cost of living. The diﬀer-
ence is on the order of 20 points, which, again, is large given the mean of the
index (0.83). This coeﬃcient is also stable across speciﬁcations. That the cri-
sis aﬀected urban households more than rural ones is consistent with the
preliminary results of Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett (1999) as well as with
Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999). We ﬁnd that household size no
longer seems to matter and that the coeﬃcient on the education of the head
of household becomes negative. The former eﬀect is consistent with larger
households’ having more housing services and self-produced agriculture.
The later eﬀect is consistent with higher-education households’ engaging in
less self-production. Finally, including provincial ﬁxed eﬀects mutes the im-
pact of log income, but it remains the case that the coeﬃcient is precisely es-
timated and negative. Little else changes with the ﬁxed eﬀects.16
12.7 Conclusions and Caveats
12.7.1 Conclusions
The recent ﬁnancial crisis in Indonesia has resulted in dramatic price in-
creases. When we ask if these price increases have hit the cost of living of poor
households disproportionately hard, the answer is usually “yes.” Just how
hard the poor have been hit, though, depends crucially on where the house-
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16. We also experimented with an interaction term between log income and the rural
dummy. In those (unreported) results, we ﬁnd that Priceindex   2.22 – 0.10   ln(y) – 1.46  
Rural   0.10   (ln(y)   Rural). All coeﬃcients were precisely estimated. Hence, the negative
relationship between income and the price index (index 3) is present only for households in ur-
ban areas (as we might expect, given the ﬁndings in table 12.5).hold lives, whether the household is in a rural or urban area, and just how the
cost of living is computed. What is clear is that the notion that the very poor
are so poor as to be insulated from international shocks is simply wrong.
Rather, in the Indonesian case, the very poor appear the most vulnerable.
Our results emphasize the importance of heterogeneity when measuring
the impact of the Indonesian economic crisis on households. We ﬁnd that
prices vary substantially across the disparate regions of Indonesia. Prices
also vary across the types of goods considered. Households are also quite
heterogeneous, even within income deciles, with respect to observable char-
acteristics. On top of this variation, consumption patterns vary both by re-
gion and by income class. For these reasons, we ﬁnd it most helpful to think
about distributions of responses, and we have employed methods that, in
most cases, do not rely on particular parametric assumptions.
By matching data on price changes with data on household consumption
from a nationally representative Indonesian data source, we have calculated
household-speciﬁc cost-of-living increases. Because our measure—a
Lespeyres-type index—does not account for potential substitution among
products, our ﬁgures provide an upward bound on the likely increase in the
cost of living. We ﬁnd a substantial increase in the mean cost of living, on
the order of 130 percent, if we disregard the relative beneﬁts of self-
produced agriculture and owned housing. The measured increase is greater
for poorer households and households in rural areas. There is a great deal
of provincial variation in the measured cost-of-living increases, although,
as evidenced by the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results, there is as much varia-
tion within provinces as between them.
Our results also illustrate the role that agricultural self-production and
owned housing played in dampening the impact of the crisis. When we ac-
count for these beneﬁts, the estimated mean cost of living falls to 84 percent,
and this cost is now lower for rural households. Of all households, the ur-
ban poor appear the most adversely impacted by the crisis. Their cost of liv-
ing tended to rise the most, and, being poor, these households are presum-
ably among the least able to absorb these increases.
12.7.2 . . . And Caveats
There are several reasons to view our results with caution. These include
the absence of information about wages and incomes, potential problems
with the price data that underlie our indexes, the fact that we used 1993 con-
sumption data to proxy 1997 consumption patterns, the biases inherent in
a Lespeyres index approach, and the confounding inﬂuences of shocks
other than that of the economic crisis. Each is discussed in turn.
Wages
This paper has analyzed variations in the changes in nominal prices dur-
ing the Indonesian economic crisis. Of course we would also like to know
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of the crisis. Unfortunately, our data contain no information on the changes
in household income over the course of the crisis. However, two alternative
sources of data do have some information on wage changes. Data from the
BPS (obtained from their web site at [http://www.bps.go.id]) reveal that
nominal wages for many broad occupational classiﬁcations have increased
throughout 1998. For example, the reported increase in the mean wage from
September 1997 through September 1998 for industrial workers stands at 26
percent. The median wage has also increased an almost identical 25 per-
cent. Workers in the basic metal and metal working industries witnessed the
highest wage increases, of about 40 percent, while wages in the paper and
chemical industries increased less than 20 percent. There is also extensive
regional variation in nominal wage increases. The largest wage gains re-
ported were for workers in Sulawesi, who experienced increases of 87 per-
cent, whereas wages in Jakarta increased only 12 percent. It is apparent,
however, that the nominal increase in wages was not nearly enough to oﬀset
the detrimental eﬀects of the rapid price changes. Frankenberg, Thomas,
and Beegle (1999) ﬁnd signiﬁcant erosion in the real wage, especially for
workers in urban areas, where the real wage has fallen 30 percent for men
and 37 percent for women. The real wage has declined less in rural areas (18
percent for men and 19 percent for women), although overall wages are still
signiﬁcantly lower for rural workers.
Although rising nominal wages will dampen the impact of rising prices,
that helps only workers who actually earn the wages. Workers who instead
become unemployed are hit doubly hard. Badan Pusat Statistik statistics
indicate that unemployment rose from about four million workers in 1997
to over ﬁve million in 1998. On the other hand, the crisis has led to a slightly
higher proportion of men, and a considerably higher proportion of women,
currently working. The increased proportion working is largely due to un-
paid family workers entering the labor force and somewhat mitigates the
detrimental eﬀects of the decline in real wages and the rise in unemploy-
ment. This is apparent in the reported changes in household per capita ex-
penditures, where the declines, although still signiﬁcant, are not as large as
the declines in wages. According to Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle
(1999), mean per capita household expenditures have fallen 34 percent in
urban areas and 13 percent in rural areas (although the median per capita
expenditures have declined only 5 percent and 2 percent for urban and ru-
ral households, respectively).
Inaccurate Price Data
Our price data come from observations in urban areas. Due to the lack of
information on rural prices, we extend these measured price changes to ru-
ral areas. However, prices in rural areas, especially remote areas, may be-
have quite diﬀerently. Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) determine
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than in urban. As well, at least for the seven provinces for which they have
some limited independent price data, Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle
suggest that actual inﬂation may be as much as 15 percent higher than the
BPS-derived inﬂation estimates. This is another reason to view our results
with caution.
1993 Consumption Data
We base our household expenditure shares on consumption data from
the 1993 SUSENAS. As incomes rise, consumption patterns change. This is
apparent if we review expenditure shares over the 1987–93 period, where a
smaller proportion of total expenditures is devoted to basic foodstuﬀs, such
as rice, for all households throughout the period-speciﬁc income distribu-
tion. Up until the economic crisis, this trend was likely to continue. To the
extent that our consumption baskets are calculated with 1993 and not 1997
data, our measured impacts of the crisis will diverge from the actual im-
pacts. However, we are also concerned with the heterogeneous eﬀects of the
crisis among households, and the relative consumption baskets (among rich
and poor households, or rural and urban households) are not likely to have
changed as much as the absolute consumption baskets over the 1993–97 pe-
riod.
The Lespeyres Index
We have examined the impact of the crisis with price data that both pre-
and postdate the crisis, but we do not observe quantities corresponding the
higher prices. For households that do not engage in any self-production
(which would include virtually all urban households), this means that our
cost-of-living index is an upper bound on the true change in the cost of liv-
ing. For households that do engage in agricultural self-production, the bias
is lessened.
Not a Controlled Experiment
It is easy to forget that the Indonesian economic crisis was not the only
change in the economic environment over this period. Concurrent with the
crisis, some areas of Indonesia were hard hit by forest ﬁres and others by
drought. These and other disasters aﬀect prices, so not all the price changes
we observe in the data are due solely to the economic crisis. Put another
way, prices would have changed some even absent the crisis.
For all of these reasons (and surely more), one should view our results
with some caution. On the other hand, the severity of the crisis and the sheer
magnitude of the aﬀected population argue for presenting some evidence
given the currently available data. That has been one aim of this paper. An-
other was to document the high degree of heterogeneity in the eﬀects of the
crisis across such dimensions as region, household location, and income.
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Comment Lant Pritchett
This paper is a valuable contribution to a study of the impacts of the In-
donesian crisis. I’d like to make comments in three areas: the time series evo-
lution of the impact, and estimates of the impact, of the crisis; the regional
distribution of impacts; and the household. My comments are in part aca-
demic but principally draw on my experience of living in Indonesia from
August 1998 to August 2000, during which time I switched the academic hat
for the role of helping the World Bank and government of Indonesia ﬁ-
nance, design, and implement safety net programs aimed at mitigating the
impacts of the ﬁnancial crisis.
First, on the time evolution of the impact of the crisis this paper was ac-
tually a crucial part of unraveling a puzzle that confronted us in trying to
determine the impact on poverty of the crisis. In September 1998 there were
two estimates of the poverty impact of the crisis. One, from the govern-
ment’s statistics agency, was that absolute poverty had increased from 11
percent precrisis to over 40 percent. This estimate was badly methodologi-
cally ﬂawed in that it scaled up the poverty line by the inﬂation rate while as-
suming that nominal incomes were ﬁxed (the basic point that every buyer
has a seller and vice versa got lost in the heat of the moment).
On the other hand, there were overly sanguine estimates coming from the
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University.World Bank and others. These estimates pointed out that, although gross
domestic product (GDP) had fallen 15 percent, it was mainly driven by a
dramatic collapse in investment, and personal consumption expenditures
(the closest aggregate analogue to the expenditures used in calculating
poverty) had fallen by only about 3 percent. If the usual elasticities between
consumption expenditures and poverty held, this meant that poverty had
increased very, very little. This view had some logic to it, but the sanguinity
it implied was belied by the enormous sense of crisis in the country—and
not just in the ﬁnancial circles.
As it happens, that view too was wrong (as we came to realize, at least, by
December 1998) precisely because it overlooked the heterogeneous impact
of relative price shifts across households emphasized in this paper. The
main action, and the simplest way to think about the issue, was just to think
about rice. Rice is a tradable commodity (even though it is bulky and hence
actual trade is not large as a fraction of the total market) and hence the
rapid devaluations, especially during January 1998 and then again follow-
ing the political crisis in May 1998, had created an enormous gap between
world prices and domestic prices. The logistics agency was able to stabilize
domestic prices only until August, and during three weeks in August alone
the price of rice rose over 50 percent. Because rice was a much larger com-
ponent of the consumption bundle of the poor than of the nonpoor, this
meant that the poverty line—the level of consumption expenditures neces-
sary—increased by much more than measured CPI inﬂation.
Therefore, the increase in poverty caused by the crisis came on very sud-
denly and was much larger than anyone had expected—an increase of at
least 15 percentage points (not the mistaken 30 of the statistics agency, but
not the puny 3 of the ﬁrst-round World Bank estimates either).
The second point on the time series of impact was the evolution of nom-
inal wages, which is of course a weakness of pure price-based measures of
impact. Because Indonesia has been a low-inﬂation country (less than 20
percent since the inﬂations of the late 1960s) there was little short-run in-
dexation of wages. Therefore the impact eﬀect was almost perfectly mea-
sured by price changes, because nominal wages responded very slowly.
However, as inﬂation accelerated it was clear that real wages had clearly
overshot, as they had fallen by 40 percent or more (and more for the poor
than nonpoor, given the relative price eﬀects). By 1999, one year after the
crisis increase in rice prices (which followed the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 by
one year), inﬂation had been contained, there were favorable developments
in the price of rice (partly occasioned by reductions in the international dol-
lar price), and real wages had recovered substantially.
Second, the regionaldimension of the crisis was an important dimension,
especially in trying to design programs to mitigate impact, because we
needed to know where to focus. Here there are three points.
On the urban/rural diﬀerence in impact, I think of the impact of the cri-
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wrong. That is, there is no question that the epicenter of the crisis was ur-
ban areas: this was principally a crisis of the collapse of the modern sector
tied into international ﬁnance. However, although that was the epicenter,
the shock waves rolled out to aﬀect everyone in two ways. The price eﬀects
of the devaluation passed into prices, so that even the peasant farthest re-
moved from the ﬁnancial centers saw his or her real wages fall. Also, how-
ever, the labor markets in Indonesia are very integrated between rural and
urban areas (especially on Java), so that what began as a loss of work for
urban construction workers, bus drivers, and informal service providers
quickly spilled into a loss of remittances to their rural families and then an
impact on the rural labor market as they returned from the cities.
On the distribution of the impact across provinces, there were clearly ar-
eas in which at least some beneﬁted from the crisis—the areas that grew
agriculture exports, especially. In some areas the phrase was hidup krismon
(“long live the monetary crisis”), and one often heard reports that local
Suzuki dealerships were short of stock and were shipping from Jakarta to
the outer islands to meet demand.
The third point, and this is more closely related to the paper method-
ologically, is the inability of price changes to distinguish between demand
and supply shocks. That is, it is impossible to tell a priori whether prices are
rising more in an area exogenously and hence represent a negative shock or
whether prices are increasing in that area because there is a positive shock
and hence demand is driving up prices more in that region than others. As
I look at the distribution of price changes reported in the paper, I am not
sure whether I am seeing negative welfare eﬀects, positive “demand pull”
eﬀects, or measurement error. Certainly from a program design point of
view we would have had a very diﬃcult time convincing the authorities to
allocate the ﬁscal resources being devoted to the crisis on the basis of price
changes alone.
Third, although this method does give a good look at some heterogene-
ity across households at an aggregate level (e.g., rural versus urban poor),
one thing we learned was that the churning in household welfare was huge,
even relative to the large changes in averages. We were lucky to have several
panel data sets collected that spanned the crisis. In those we could see that
more than one-quarter of those who were “in poverty” in the postcrisis pe-
riod were more than 50 percent above the poverty line in the precrisis data.
Not surprisingly, the increase in poverty was not a uniform downward shift
in the income distribution but a downward shift accompanied by enormous
churning.
One thing this points to was the heterogeneity even within income and re-
gional groups. For instance, the paper makes the good point that whether
you grew your own rice made a huge diﬀerence, because the negative price
impact was at least partially oﬀset by a positive gain in income (conceptu-
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“poorest 10 percent of rural households” produced on average 50 percent
of the rice they consumed, obviously not all households produced 50 per-
cent; rather, some produced zero, others 100 percent, and everything in be-
tween.
This is also true within regions. As we got more data, we realized that
even within areas that were booming it was not the case that everyone was
beneﬁting, and even in booming export crops the gains were slow to pass
into real wage gains. Thus, even within “winner” regions there were huge
diﬀerences between “winner” and “loser” households.
This meant in targeting programs we either had to go universal or devise
a mechanism that did better than aggregate groupings, or else the risk of
missing some badly shocked households within aggregates was very large.
In the event, there was a mix of programs, some universal (or nearly so),
some targeted at the community level, and some (such as labor creation)
that targeted “self-selection.”
In conclusion, this paper is an excellent illustration of beginning to trace
through the impacts of the crisis, which are fundamentally complex, as rel-
ative price and employment shifts produce reallocations across regions and
households. In the end, the programs that were implemented beneﬁted from
the conceptual clarity this type of exercise brings, but unfortunately pro-
gram design was often more determined and constrained by politics and ad-
ministrative pragmatics than by good estimates of the impacts.
Discussion Summary
Olivier Blanchard inquired why food prices increased more than the prices
of other goods—as a lot of these are nontradable. Lant Pritchett replied
that rice, the major component of food expenditures in Indonesia, is a trad-
able because there was a lot of export of rice and even re-exporting of sub-
sidized imported rice. Jeﬀrey A. Frankel added that rice is a textbook ex-
ample of a traded good subject to world market prices.
John McHalerelated this paper to the causes of the output loss following
a crisis. He noted that participants have been attributing the loss to balance
sheet eﬀects, but this paper ﬁnds declines in real wages. In industrial coun-
tries such declines are typically long run, but this, it seems, was not the case
in Indonesia.
Martin Feldstein noted that following these price increases it is likely that
households reduced, ﬁrst of all, their consumption of durables, such as
clothing. He then suggested ways to account for that in the data and thus
measure more accurately the immediate loss, in terms of current consump-
tion of nondurables (food), that was caused by the crisis.
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eﬀects of crises on diﬀerent groups, which is a topic that is typically ignored.
This heterogeneity, he noted, has political economy implications for getting
support for adjustment programs, because there were even, as Pritchett
made clear, gainers from the real exchange rate depreciation. Also, he noted
that many times the adjustment is not undertaken not because domestic
policy makers don’t know what should be done, as Martin Eichenbaum im-
plied in a previous comment, but because they don’t have the political sup-
port to implement it.
Jong-Wha Lee suggested better characterization of the ones who were
hardest hit in terms of education levels, age, and the like. In terms of unem-
ployment, for example, he asked who were the ones who lost their jobs and
whether that loss was permanent. This information has signiﬁcance for so-
cial expenditure decisions.
Lastly, Jeﬀrey Shafer remarked that identifying the reasons for hetero-
geneity, such as the distinction between urban and rural, is very important.
This heterogeneity is important both for mitigating policy questions and be-
cause it is a result of policy decisions.
James Levinsohn noted that diﬀerentiating between demand and supply
shocks should, as Pritchett noted, be accounted for, provided better data
are available. The exact way in which households adjusted is not entirely
clear. He mentioned a survey that found that there was a huge disinvestment
in jewelry—households sold the jewelry they owned. In response to Feld-
stein’s comment, Levinsohn noted that it is worthwhile trying to account for
this change in consumption patterns, but better time series data might be
needed.
Peter B. Kenen also noted that it would not change the results much, be-
cause expenditures on clothing and on the durable component of housing
are relatively small in poor or rural communities.
Pritchett remarked, in response to Drazen, that although there certainly
is a political economy of adjustment, it doesn’t focus on objections to ad-
justment because it hurts the rural poor. Typically, as was the case in In-
donesia with fuel and rice subsidies, the poor have no political power, and
objections to adjustment come from the middle class. He noted that the In-
donesian government chose to continue subsidizing fuel massively, and not
rice, because of such considerations.
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